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ABSTRACT
Evaluating the Security of Smart Home Hubs
Steven A. Christiaens
School of Technology, BYU
Master of Science
The goal of this research is to improve the security of smart home hubs by developing a
standard against which hubs can be evaluated. This was done by first reviewing existing
standards, guides, and collections of best practices. I determined that adapting or extending an
existing standard was the best way to proceed. Potential candidates were selected, and after
thorough comparison, I chose to extend the OWASP Application Security Verification Standard
(ASVS).
Extensions were composed of additional security requirements to address smart home
hub functionality not covered by the existing requirements of the ASVS. These additional
requirements were developed based upon existing best practices and are referred to as the Smart
Home Extensions. Where a best practice or guidance did not yet exist for a particular hub
functionality, guidance from related fields was adapted. The entire set of Smart Home
Extensions were reviewed by industry experts, updated based on feedback, and then sent on for
further peer review.
Four smart home hubs – VeraLite, Wink, Connect, and SmartThings – were evaluated
using the ASVS with the Smart Home Extensions. The evaluation uncovered security
vulnerabilities in all four hubs, some previously disclosed by other researchers, and others new.
Analysis of the evaluation data suggests that authentication is a common problem area, among
others. Based on the performance of the hubs and the data collected, I suggest that the ASVS
and Smart Home Extensions can be an effective tool to provide insight into the security posture
of smart home hubs.

Keywords: smart home, hub, internet of things, IoT, home automation, security, OWASP ASVS,
application security verification standard, smart home extensions
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INTRODUCTION

The number of devices connected to the Internet is growing quickly. Cisco Systems
estimates that close to 100 things are being added to the Internet every second (Tillman 2013).
The increasing popularity of smart home devices is a big contributor to this growth. Whether
someone wants to control their lighting system from the couch, check on the oven while working
in the garden, or lock up for the night from the comfort of their bed, there is a smart home device
that can help them do it. With the increasing ubiquity of smartphones and tablets, finding the
remote control is as easy as opening an app.
Many smart home devices offer their own app, but this leads to problems as the number of
smart devices continues to grow. A consumer with three brands of connected lightbulbs, two smart
locks and a network-connected baby monitor may find they need five or six different apps on their
phone to control everything. No one wants to have to open a different app for each brand of light
bulb they use, not to mention keeping track of a different password for each device. To address
these and numerous other issues, manufacturers have introduced smart home hubs.
Smart home hubs today are similar in form and function to a consumer-grade wireless
router. They are generally small form-factor devices which house one or more wireless antennas
and often support multiple communications protocols including Wi-Fi, Z-Wave, ZigBee, Insteon,
Bluetooth and others (Lodamo and Forsström 2012). They are referred to as hubs because they
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act as the central point of contact for a network of smart devices that may include door locks,
window and door sensors, lighting controls, thermostats, and a range of other devices.
Most smart home hubs can be thought of as liaisons or butlers. Once a consumer has
installed the hub, they are prompted to install an app on their mobile device. From then on all
communication with the hub and with any associated smart devices is handled through the mobile
app. Any command, such as switching the lights on or off, is issued through the app that then
communicates with the hub. The hub takes care of issuing the correct commands to each connected
light, even if the lights are different brands and use different protocols. For consumers, this means
not having to worry about learning to use disparate apps or remembering multiple passwords. For
those with smart locks, it means no more being caught without house keys as long as they have
their mobile device. With this convenience, however, comes risk: a malicious party taking control
of a hub could control the entire house.
How can we know if these hubs that are so critical a component are secure? Many
consumers are oblivious to the security or insecurity of their devices and believe that
manufacturers or government regulations will protect them. Unfortunately, many manufacturers
entering the market have little to no experience with network or software security and government
regulation moves slowly. The Federal Trade Commission recently acknowledged that the potential
security risks to consumers includes “unauthorized access and misuse of personal information”
and even “risks to personal safety” (FTC Staff Report 2015), but regulation is still many years
away. What is needed is a way to systematically assess the security of these hubs.
The purpose of this research is to improve the security of smart home hubs. To do this, I
will be addressing the following research objectives:
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•! Apply and extend an existing application security standard so that it can be used to
evaluate the security of smart home hubs.
•! Determine what types of security vulnerabilities are most prevalent in existing
smart home hubs.
•! Develop recommendations for more secure smart home hubs that take into
consideration users and manufacturers.
The remainder of this thesis is organized into the following sections:
•! Chapter 2: Literature Review
o! An overview of the smart home environment from the perspective of current
and past research, focusing on security.

A look at existing security

frameworks and their applicability to smart homes and the Internet of
Things (IoT). This chapter also includes a discussion of where this research
fits into the overall discussion.
•! Chapter 3: Methodology
o! A detailed description of research questions and objectives along with the
methods employed to answer them.
•! Chapter 4: Smart Home Extensions for the OWASP ASVS
o! A summary of why the OWASP Application Security Verification Standard
(ASVS) was chosen, how extensions were developed, and what was
changed over time due to feedback and testing. This chapter also includes
the proposed extensions.
•! Chapter 5: A Security Evaluation of Four Smart Home Hubs
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o! Results of using the ASVS and Smart Home Extensions to test four marketleading smart home hubs. Includes descriptions of where the devices
performed well and where they failed to implement security best practices.
•! Chapter 6: Recommendations for Smart Home Hub Security
o! Recommendations for improving the security of future smart home hubs,
organized by stakeholder. The stakeholders included are device users and
device manufacturers.
•! Chapter 7: Discussion and Future Work
o! Summary and discussion of findings and recommendations as well as
intended applications and limitations of the smart home extensions.
Includes a brief discussion of possible future work.
•! Appendix A: Supplementary Materials
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2!

LITERATURE REVIEW

Commercial and academic interest in the smart home arena has picked up in recent years
as more and more consumer devices include some sort of network connectivity. Conferences such
as Smart Home World, TV Connect, ICOST, Connections, and numerous others organized in just
the last ten years continue to be successful. One of the largest showcase venues for commercial
devices, the Consumer Electronics Show, expanded in 2015 to include exhibit space specifically
for smart home devices (Brown 2014). Some small colleges have even begun to offer certifications
in smart home technology, while Duke University engineering students can become “Smart Home
Research Fellows” (Martinsburg College 2015; Nicolet College 2015; Pratt School of Engineering
2015).
Along with the increase of popular interest, significant research has gone into defining and
expanding the field. Many researchers have studied the problem of smart home network and
system designs (Han and Lim 2010; Hussein et al. 2014; Davidoff, Lee, and Yiu 2006), while
others have characterized the various wired and wireless standards (Lodamo and Forsström 2012;
Gomez and Paradells 2010). Due to the large amount of data generated by these devices, there has
also been research into how to process and organize that data (Cook et al. 2003; Zhang, Leung,
and Chan 2008).
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2.1! Security
Policymakers, researchers, and industry groups alike recognize security in the smart home
arena as a critical issue. Addressing risks introduced by the Internet of things, of which the smart
home is a major part, the Federal Trade Commission (FTC) asserted that it presents “a variety of
potential security risks”. More specifically, the Commission recognized that these devices could
be exploited “to harm consumers by: (1) enabling unauthorized access and misuse of personal
information; (2) facilitating attacks on other systems; and (3) creating risks to personal safety.”
(FTC Staff Report 2015).
Academic and private sector researchers have focused mainly on privacy (Möllers and
Seitz 2014; Weber 2010; Jakkula and Cook 2008), though all recognize the link between privacy
and security. Numerous privacy issues exist. Weber describes the difficulties of keeping private
information truly private and of preventing a smart object from leaking information about its owner
(Weber 2010). Möllers and Seitz were able to extrapolate and predict user actions in a home
throughout the day based solely on passive wireless packet captures. In one case, they were able
to determine the occupant’s weekly schedule and accurately predict whether the home was
occupied or vacant, making it easy to plan a burglary. All of this was discovered without any prior
knowledge of the type or number of sensors in the home (Möllers and Seitz 2014). Similarly,
using machine learning and only the data available from smart sensors, Jakkula and Cook
developed techniques to automatically build a model of expected behavior for individuals and
detect anomalies (Jakkula and Cook 2008). By knowing exactly what an individual was doing
inside their home, they hoped to be able to alert emergency responders of any problems. The data
generated by this level of surveillance needs to be properly secured, as improper access to it could
have significant privacy implications.
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In the commercial sector, security firms are beginning to perform penetration testing on
smart home devices to identify weaknesses in their design. One firm, Xipiter, published a
walkthrough of how they performed hardware and software exploitation against various smart
home devices. For one smart home hub, they obtained root shell access, exposed password hashes
through a directory traversal vulnerability, and showed that all of these hubs share the same SSH
private keys (Xipiter 2014). Another team at Hewlett-Packard looked at 10 different smart home
devices and found that “70 percent did not encrypt communications to the Internet and local
network” (Smith and Miessler 2014). There is clearly ample room for improvement.
Despite the growing body of research related to smart home security, no material was found
that focuses on systematically evaluating the security of hubs.

As discussed previously,

researchers have performed penetration testing of hubs, but typically it has only been against a
single hub (Crowley, Savage, and Bryan 2013; Xipiter 2014). Other researchers have attempted
to improve the overall security of these devices by focusing on usability (Kalofonos and Shakhshir
2007). By using metaphors, intuitive design, and a collection of middleware, Kalofonos and
Shakhshir hoped to encourage the use of security for non-experts and prevent misconfiguration of
security controls. While this could potentially improve overall security, it still does not address
the problem of devices or services that are inherently insecure or contain security-related design
flaws. Given the increasingly critical role of smart home hubs, a comprehensive approach to
evaluating these devices would be valuable.

2.2! Evaluation Standards, Guides, and Frameworks
The goal of this research is to develop a systematic way to evaluate the security of smart
home hubs. This has been done in related domains, such as web applications and wireless
networking (Meucci and Muller 2014; Council on Cyber Security 2014), however guidance in the
7

smart home arena is nonexistent. This is likely due to lack of maturity in the field, something
noted by FTC Commissioner Joshua D. Wright when he described the “Internet of Things” as “a
nascent concept about which the only apparent consensus is that predicting its technological
evolution and ultimate impact upon consumers is difficult” (Wright 2015).
When discussing methods to evaluate the security of a device, application, or service, it is
helpful to briefly define a few terms. Although there is often overlap in the content of these items,
the level of detail and purpose for which they were designed are what set them apart from each
other.
Framework: Although many definitions exist, a framework is simply a structured way to
think about a topic. In the information technology field, frameworks are often quite detailed and
describe processes – ways that an application or system should work – without defining how to
implement those processes.

Some notable frameworks in information security are Control

Objectives for Information and Related Technology, or COBIT (ISACA 2012), the NIST
Framework for Improving Critical Infrastructure Cybersecurity (National Institute of Standards
and Technology 2014), and the Sender Policy Framework for e-mail (SPF Council 2004).
Hardening Guides: These focus on system hardening, which Berkeley Security describes
as "the process of securely configuring computer systems, to eliminate as many security risks as
possible".

Hardening guides are commonly written by the software publisher or device

manufacturer and are aimed at system administrators, the ones most likely to perform the
configuration changes. The purpose of most hardening guides is to increase security via built-in
configuration settings. Some examples are Apple’s OS X Security Configuration Guides (Apple
Inc. 2015), VMware’s Security Hardening Guides (VMware 2015), and Microsoft’s Threats and
Countermeasures Guide (Andersen et al. 2011).
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Standard: With regard to technical systems, a standard is “an established norm or
requirement […] It is usually a formal document that establishes uniform engineering or technical
criteria, methods, processes and practices.” (“Technical Standard” 2015) If something is going to
receive a certification, it is usually compared to or measured against a standard. Notable standards
in information security include the ISO 27000 series and the Payment Card Industry Data Security
Standard, also known as PCI-DSS or simply PCI (International Organization for Standardization
2015; PCI Security Standards Council 2013).
Testing Guide: A testing guide defines an approach to testing, and may accompany a
framework, standard, or hardening guide. While a standard or framework may say "Ensure that
the application is not susceptible to SQL injection", the testing guide will say "Test for SQL
injection using the following tools and techniques...” and may include specific criteria for what
constitutes a success or failure when testing. The most well-known testing guide in the information
security arena is probably the OWASP Testing Guide (Meucci and Muller 2014).
As stated earlier, there is often significant overlap in the content of these documents. What
one group refers to as a framework may be used as a standard, and some testing guides are more
akin to a framework or a hardening guide. Furthermore, other respected resources covering the
topic are not referred to by any of the above terms, most notably the Critical Security Controls for
Effective Cyber Defense (Council on Cyber Security 2014). When reviewing these documents
and the methods contained therein for applicability to a particular topic, the important thing is the
information they contain, not their titles.

2.3! Candidate Frameworks
In the arena of smart homes, home automation, and the “Internet of Things”, there currently
exist no framework or testing guide for evaluating the security of devices or hubs. Best practice
9

recommendations exist in the form of an FTC staff report, indicating that security is clearly of
interest to the FTC (FTC Staff Report 2015). However, the report mentions no methods for
performing a security evaluation on an Internet of Things device. Perhaps more concerning, one
FTC commissioner dissented from the decision to publish these best practices, noting that the
Commission did not “…actually engage in a rigorous cost-benefit analysis prior to disseminating
best practices…” (Wright 2015).
Although guidance specific to the Internet of Things does not appear to exist, much less
specifically to home automation hubs, there are testing guides, standards, and other projects in
related fields that are applicable. For my purposes, I selected six projects as potential candidates
for adapting or extending to cover home automation hubs:

2.3.1! The Critical Security Controls for Effective Cyber Defense
The Critical Security Controls for Effective Cyber Defense, also referred to as the Critical
Security Controls (CSC), was put together by industry experts in 2008 with the aim to be “the most
effective and specific set of technical measures available to detect, prevent, and mitigate damage
from the most common and damaging … attacks” (Council on Cyber Security 2014). It is a
collection of 20 technical measures along with supporting documentation on how to implement,
test, and automate those measures. It has elements of a framework and a generalized hardening
guide.
The stated goals of the project are to “protect critical assets, infrastructure, and information
by strengthening [an] organization's defensive posture through continuous, automated protection
and monitoring of […] sensitive information technology infrastructure to reduce compromises,
minimize the need for recovery efforts, and lower associated costs” (SANS Institute 2015). Based
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on the longevity of the project and the number of mappings to different regulatory requirements
and standards, one may surmise that the project has been successful.
An advantage of the Critical Security Controls is that the implementation guide includes
multiple levels of complexity, starting with implementing the control at a very basic level to
completely automating the control and associated monitoring. This means that the controls can be
beneficial to a wide range of users, from home users and small businesses looking to increase
security, to large enterprises with mature security practices and policies.
As mentioned previously, the aim of the Critical Security Controls is to protect networks,
devices, and organizations from the most common cyber-attacks. Because smart home hubs share
many similarities with existing network devices, such as web servers and wireless access points,
the Controls seem a good fit for evaluating the security of hubs. They are, however, a poor fit for
this task.
The Controls are not sufficiently specific when it comes to smart home hubs. Although
the structure of the Controls is such that they can be useful to a broad range of users, many of the
recommendations would only be applicable to medium and large networks and organizations.
CSC 3, for example, suggests developing secure configurations for hardware and software on
mobile devices, laptops, workstations and servers. It does not offer guidance on how to come up
with a secure configuration. A hardening guide could fill that knowledge-gap; however no
hardening guides exist for any smart home hubs currently on the market. CSC 3 and other controls
would have to be removed or significantly changed to apply to smart home hubs.
Another example of the lack of specificity is the guidance on wireless communication.
While the Controls include a section on wireless access control, they consider only WiFi and
Bluetooth. The recommendation on Bluetooth is to “Disable wireless peripheral access of devices
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(such as Bluetooth), unless such access is required for a documented business need.” For smart
home hubs, there is often a “business need” for Bluetooth. This introduces another possible attack
vector, which the Controls do not adequately address. Furthermore, hubs often use four or more
different wireless protocols, many of which are not addressed by the Critical Security Controls.

2.3.2! OWASP Application Security Verification Standard
The Open Web Application Security Project (OWASP) is an online community that started
in 2001 with a focus on improving the security of software. The major deliverables of OWASP
are its projects, and the Application Security Verification Standard (ASVS) is one of their flagship
projects. The focus of the ASVS is “to normalize the range in the coverage and level of rigor
available in the market when it comes to performing Web application security verification using a
commercially-workable open standard” (OWASP 2014a). Originally released in 2009, the ASVS
has received numerous updates, with version 2.0 in August of 2014 and version 3.0 expected in
November of 2015.
The ASVS contains verification requirements grouped together by topic. Each verification
requirement addresses a single aspect of the overall topic. Under the topic of authentication, for
example, one requirement is “Verify all password fields do not echo the user’s password when it
is entered”. Another reads “Verify all pages and resources require authentication except those
specifically intended to be public”.

In addition to authentication, topics include session

management, malicious input handling, data protection, communications security, and more. All
of these topics and requirements focus on functionality that may be offered by a web application.
Similar to how the Critical Security Controls contain controls of varying complexity, the
ASVS is divided into four levels of verification, numbered zero to three. Level zero is intentionally
undefined by the standard, while levels one through three are meant to protect an application
12

against opportunistic, standard, and advanced attackers, respectively. This is useful because not
every application has the same business requirements. An online banking application containing
sensitive information and functionality may call for scrutiny, while an application made purely for
marketing purposes needs only a cursory review.
The limitation of the ASVS when it comes to smart home hubs is that it focuses almost
exclusively on web application security. While web applications provide a significant portion of
the functionalities in existing hubs, these hubs also include components that are usually handled
by an operating system, such as network interfaces and wireless antennas. On its own, the ASVS
is not sufficiently comprehensive to evaluate the security of a smart home hub.

2.3.3! CWE/SANS Top 25 Most Dangerous Software Errors
The CWE/SANS Top 25 Most Dangerous Software Errors is a list compiled by SANS
Institute and MITRE, two organizations that are well-known in the field of information security
for their research and educational materials. The Top 25 is designed to promote education and
awareness about “the most widespread and critical errors that can lead to serious vulnerabilities in
software” (SANS 2011). SANS and MITRE released the list in 2010 and updated it in 2011, but
it is no longer maintained as other projects have taken precedence (MITRE 2014). Because the
factors contributing to vulnerable software change little over time, I included the Top 25 as a
candidate for adaptation to smart home hubs.
The Common Weakness Enumeration (CWE), from which the Top 25 is taken, consists of
a list of common weaknesses in software. These weaknesses are described as flaws, faults, bugs,
vulnerabilities, and other errors in the implementation, code, design, or architecture of a piece of
software. Some examples are authentication errors, code evaluation and injection, and buffer
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overflows. Each list item includes information about the common consequences of these errors as
well as examples and a brief discussion about technical impact.
The purposes of the CWE as described by MITRE are as follows: to serve as a common
language for describing software security weaknesses; to serve as a measuring stick for software
security tools targeting these weaknesses; and to provide a common baseline standard for weakness
identification, mitigation, and prevention efforts (2014). This means that the list as a whole was
intended to be comprehensive, and that is reflected in the over 1,000 entries it contains (MITRE
and SANS Institute 2010). The 25 most common of these weaknesses and errors comprise the
Top 25.
As previously mentioned, the Top 25 is meant to promote awareness about the most
widespread and critical errors that can lead to serious vulnerabilities in software. Software controls
everything in a smart home hub, so the Top 25 should be directly applicable. In this case, however,
the widely applicable nature of the Top 25 is a weakness as well as a strength. As stated by
MITRE, the list “…contain[s] a mix of weaknesses with some only applicable to specific
applications or technologies.” (2014). While the CWE was designed to be used as a measuring
stick, it was to measure the coverage of security scanning tools, not to measure the security of
generic applications. Using the Top 25 to evaluate the security of smart home hubs would require
significant changes, not unlike creating an entirely new framework. Existing weaknesses not
applicable to smart home hubs would need to be removed and missing weaknesses would have to
be added. Such changes would likely impact the effectiveness of the document as a tool to promote
awareness. If changes were to be made, other candidates, such as the Application Security
Verification Framework and the OWASP Testing Guide, would be better choices given their
design as tools for testing web applications.
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2.3.4! OWASP Testing Guide
The OWASP Testing Guide is described as a penetration testing framework which users
can implement in their own organizations and a penetration testing guide that describes techniques
for testing the most common web application and web service security issues (OWASP 2015).
The Testing Guide claims to capture the consensus of leading experts on how to perform security
testing and is put together completely by volunteers. The first version of the Testing Guide was
released in 2003 and the most recent, version 4.0, was released in September 2014.
Similar to the ASVS, the Testing Guide is one of OWASP’s flagship projects, which means
that it has shown strategic value to OWASP and application security as a whole (OWASP 2015).
The guide itself consists of two major parts. The first part contains a framework for penetration
testing that includes a description of the Software Development Life Cycle, a discussion about
where security testing fits in the life cycle, and why different types of security testing are important.
The second part contains a listing of typical vulnerabilities found in web applications along with
recommendations for how to test for these vulnerabilities. This listing is grouped by vulnerability
type and progresses logically such that a tester could follow it and go from basic to advanced
testing of an application.
This ease-of-use is one of the primary strengths of the Testing Guide. A tester with the
requisite skill would have little trouble following the guide and, once all tests were complete, could
be reasonably confident that they had thoroughly tested the application and knew its weaknesses.
The other strength of the guide is it’s thorough descriptions of how to test for various weaknesses.
Using the guide, a user that is unfamiliar with how to test for a particular vulnerability can quickly
learn the basics of the vulnerability as well as a few different methods to test for it.
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Similar to the ASVS, the Testing Guide is potentially a great fit for testing the security of
smart home hubs because web applications provide much of the functionality of a hub. However,
it also shares that same weakness in that it focuses exclusively on web applications. Where it
differs a bit more from the ASVS is in the design and purpose of its tests. The tests contained in
the guide are designed to detect whether vulnerabilities are present. In practice, this means that
the guide is great at helping a tester ascertain that something is done incorrectly, but provides little
guidance on how to tell if something is done correctly, or at least according to best practices. For
the purposes of the Testing Guide, this is perfectly acceptable; for evaluating the overall security
of a smart home hub, this is a significant limitation.

2.3.5! Other Potential Candidates
The final two potential candidates came from the OWASP Top Ten Project and the
OWASP Internet of Things Top Ten Project. While the projects have many similarities, the
deliverables of the two projects differ in important ways. Neither, however, is a good match for
evaluating smart home hubs. We will briefly examine each in turn, starting with the Top Ten
Project.
The OWASP Top Ten Project started in 2004 and participants update its deliverables every
three years. The output of the Top Ten Project is a list of the top ten most critical security flaws
found in web applications based on a broad consensus of industry experts (OWASP 2013). The
purpose of this document is to raise awareness about security and it is one of the most recognized
resources in the industry. The Top Ten Project provides information about what causes each flaw,
how to test for them, and how to prevent them.
With the focus of the Top Ten list being education and awareness, it is a poor fit for
evaluating smart home hubs. While the list can be applied to smart home hubs due to its focus on
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web applications, it was never meant to be a comprehensive listing of possible flaws. The list
authors even say that “Adopting the OWASP Top Ten is perhaps the most effective first step
towards changing the software development culture within [an] organization” [emphasis added]
(OWASP 2013). It is clearly a poor choice for adaptation.
The Internet of Things Top Ten Project is a more recent development, with their first
deliverable produced in 2014. That deliverable is a list of the 10 most significant security surface
areas presented by IoT systems. Also known as the attack surface of a software environment, the
security surface area is the subset of the system’s resources that an attacker can use to attack the
system (Manadhata 2008). In addition to defining these security surface areas, the list also
provides information on threat agents, attack vectors, vulnerabilities, and associated impacts
(OWASP 2014b).
The IoT Top Ten stands out from the other candidates mentioned because it focuses
specifically on Internet of Things devices, as opposed to web applications or software in general.
However, it is meant as a tool for education and guidance, and as such is ill-suited to serving as a
tool to evaluate or rate the security of existing products. Furthermore, it was purposely created as
a top 10 list to make it easy to understand and present to others. Significantly altering the structure
of the existing deliverable, by creating a top 14 or top 16, would likely serve only to confuse users.
While both the Top 10 and IoT Top 10 are respected in the industry, they share many of
the same limitations exhibited by previous candidates. This was also the case for other candidates
not listed here. Many of the existing frameworks and guides are relevant to IoT and therefore
smart home hubs, but none is sufficiently specific or comprehensive in that arena. It is for this
reason that I propose to extend an existing framework. Although there is significant overlap among
the candidates described herein, for my purposes, the OWASP ASVS is the best candidate given

17

its format and the breadth of information it already contains. The other candidates will inform the
extensions to the ASVS.
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3!

METHODOLOGY

This thesis focuses on two research objectives and one research question:
Research Objective 1 (RO-1): Develop and test extended requirements to the ASVS for
evaluating the security of smart home hubs.
Research Question 1 (RQ-1): What types of security vulnerabilities are most prevalent in
existing smart home hubs?
Research Objective 2 (RO-2): Develop recommendations for a more secure smart home
hub that take into consideration both users and hub manufacturers.
The methods used to reach these objectives and address the research question are outlined
below, in order.

3.1! RO-1: Development and Testing of Extended Requirements
The original purpose of this research was to develop from scratch a framework to evaluate
the security of smart home hubs. This framework was to be based, in part, on existing best
practices in related domains. However, after reviewing existing frameworks and testing guides
for those related domains, it became clear that extending an existing framework would be more
feasible and useful. More feasible due to the complexity of the domains involved, including web
application security, wireless security, cryptography, and others. More useful because an existing
framework would already have a community of users who could comment on the extensions and
19

provide feedback, and the focus could be on the novel extensions, instead of reinventing yet
another framework from scratch, which would unnecessarily compete with existing frameworks.

3.1.1! Compiling Best Practices and Choosing a Framework to Extend
To gain a better understanding of existing best practices, I reviewed frameworks and testing
guides in the related domains of web application security and enterprise security and considered
how recommended security controls would apply in the context of a smart home hub. Each of the
documents detailed in chapter two received a thorough review with an eye toward smart home
hubs. Those candidates were chosen because they are well known, contain enough detail to be
easily accessible, and the bulk of their content is applicable to smart home hubs. Other potential
candidates were discarded because they did not qualify in one or more of these areas. Some of
those include the Common Criteria, the ISO 27000 series, COBIT, and ITIL (CCRA 2012; Survey
2006; ISACA 2012; Axelos 2015).
After reviewing the documents, I chose the ASVS to serve as the base that I would extend
to include smart home hubs. It was chosen for three primary reasons: the level of detail in its
verification requirements, the range of its existing coverage, and its intended purpose. While other
candidates include tests or steps to verify that a particular class of vulnerabilities is not present on
a target, the verification requirements in the ASVS strike a balance of providing enough detail to
communicate what needs to be tested while not going into pages of explanation and examples.
This balance is not perfect, as one user will have more or less experience than another and therefore
may require more or less information, but the balance chosen by the authors results in a concise
document. This also makes for a document that is easy to understand after very little time with it.
The range of security issues covered by existing verification requirements in the ASVS
was another strength when compared to most other candidates. As discussed in chapter two,
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verification requirements are grouped by topic. The ASVS contains 13 categories and 190
requirements, with an average of 14 requirements for each category. Based on numbers alone,
these requirements easily surpass the OWASP Top 10 lists as well as the CWE Top 25. Not having
a limit on the number of requirements allows the ASVS to go into more detail. And while the
Critical Security Controls covers a similar number of issues, it is focused primarily on enterprise
security and network defense. This translates to less overlap with issues that might affect a smart
home hub. Finally, the OWASP Testing Guide covers a very similar range of issues, but the level
of detail and intended purpose of the ASVS was a better fit for the goals of this work.
As previously mentioned, these documents contain significant overlap in the issues they
address, but their purpose is what sets them apart. The ASVS stands out because the authors
purposely designed it to be a standard for performing web application security verification
(OWASP 2014a). Although the Critical Security Controls and the OWASP Top 10 may be
considered de-facto standards, they were not designed with that purpose in mind. Adapting them
or otherwise attempting to turn them into an actual standard would require significant effort.
Taking such a step does not make sense when there is already an existing standard that covers a
similar range of issues. As for the Top 10 and Top 25 lists, they were meant as tools for education
and awareness. Turning those into standards would require even more effort. Comparing
candidates based on their intended purpose, the ASVS was the most sensible choice.

3.1.2! Iteratively Developing the Smart Home Extensions
Once I had selected the ASVS to act as the base framework, I compared it with other
candidates to discover best practices that were obviously missing. Given that the ASVS is
designed to evaluate web applications, certain issues, such as wireless communication security,
were not covered and would need to be added. Having previously made a list of best practices and
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other security issues that could apply to smart home hubs when reviewing potential candidates,
this process was straightforward: any item on that list that was not addressed by the existing
requirements in the ASVS was added to a list of proposed requirements.
The next step was to gain experience with some smart home hubs to understand the
functionality offered and discover potential attack vectors not addressed by the requirements of
the ASVS. I selected six hubs as described in section 3.1.3. Each was set up according to the
manufacturer’s instructions and two smart devices, a Jasco Light and Appliance Control Module
and a Schlage Wireless Door and Window Sensor (Jasco Products Company 2015; Amazon Inc.
2014), were connected to each. After setting up the systems for traffic capture, I used as many of
the functions of each hub as possible. This included turning individual devices on and off, defining
rulesets, assigning groups, adding and removing users, backing up and restoring the hubs, and
more. In this manner, I generated a list of functions and capabilities of the different devices and
considered how those could be subverted or abused by a malicious party. Controls to prevent such
abuse were then added to the list of proposed requirements. Where possible, existing best practice
and guidance documents were referenced when defining new controls.
Once I had compiled the list of proposed requirements, I then reviewed and categorized
each item so that the structure of the new requirements matched those contained in the ASVS.
This spreadsheet of proposed requirements and references was the first draft, which was sent to
industry experts for peer review. Members of the ASVS mailing list performed the first review. I
posted the first draft to the mailing list accompanied by the following questions:
•! Are there any testing categories missing?
•! Are there any security requirements missing?
•! Are the requirements not specific enough or too specific?
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•! Would you find these additions to the ASVS useful?
•! Are any of these requirements covered by existing ASVS requirements?
I received responses from four subscribers (Christian Heinrich, Jerome Athias, Andrew van der
Stock, Aaron Guzman) and added or modified requirements based on their feedback. Next, I
contacted a series of individuals via email and asked them to review the updated extensions. As
part of this process, I performed a semi-structured interview with each them consisting of the
questions listed above. After getting feedback from an individual, I updated the requirements and
then sent them on to the next reviewer. In this manner, all modifications or additions to the
requirements were reviewed by me, the person suggesting the change, and at a minimum the next
reviewer. This process of iteratively incorporating feedback and reviewing changes was repeated
until very little new feedback was given. At that point, nine experts in the field of information
technology including Andrew van der Stock, Christian Heinrich, Jerome Athias, Rob Ragan,
Aaron Guzman, Ryan Speers, Derek Hansen, Dale Rowe, and Daniel Cuthbert had reviewed the
extensions. Initial development of the extensions was declared complete.

3.1.3! Selection of Target Hubs for Testing
With initial development of the extensions completed, the next step was to test them in a
real-world scenario. I chose four smart home hubs as targets for evaluation. Selection of these
hubs was based on perceived popularity and support for wireless protocols, such as Z-Wave and
ZigBee. By searching review sites, I was able to generate a list of 13 popular hubs, each of which
was discussed by at least two well-known sites. A list of the potential target hubs can be seen in
the figure below:
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Table 1 - Protocols Supported by Popular Hubs

Protocols$supported
WiFi Z-Wave ZigBee Bluetooth Lutron$ClearConnect IrDA WeMo INSTEON Kidde$RF Unspecified$RF
Wink%HUB
X
X
X
X
X
X
SmartThings
X
X
X
X
Lowes%Iris
X
X
X
Vera
X
X
Staples%Connect
X
X
Piper
X
X
Logitech%Harmony%Home%Hub%(*%=%with%Extender)
X
X*
X*
X
Nexia%Bridge
X
Control4
X
Lutron%Wireless%Smart%Bridge
X
WeMo%(App%based)
X
Insteon%Hub
X
iSmart%Alarm
X
Hub$Name

Once I had determined the 13 most popular hubs, I collected specifications for each of them
to determine what wireless protocols were supported. After collecting this information, it became
clear that the Z-Wave and ZigBee protocols are the most widely used among existing devices.
Although WiFi is also supported by most hubs, this is generally to allow communication with
smart phone applications, rather than provide control of smart home devices. The devices with
support for the most protocols were selected as testing targets. These devices were: Wink HUB,
SmartThings, Lowes Iris, Staples Connect, Vera, and Piper. The Logitech Harmony Home Hub
was not selected because the Extender had not been released at the time. Eventually, the Lowes
Iris and the Piper hubs were removed from the pool of testing targets due to incompatibility with
the Z-Wave- and ZigBee-enabled accessories used.

3.1.4! Setup of the Testing Environments
Setup of the testing environment required significant time and more troubleshooting than
anticipated. Some hubs offered the option of connecting to the network using a wired or wireless
connection, while others only supported one or the other, so the testing environment required both.
Even with complete control of the network, it was not possible to observe all of the traffic
24

generated by a hub. Traffic between the web browser or mobile application and a hub was captured
using a proxy. Some of this traffic was encrypted using TLS. Using a proxy, this was easily
bypassed in the web browser. However, the SmartThings and Wink hubs only offered mobile
applications and both performed certificate pinning. Decrypting traffic from those applications
required software that hooked system API calls to bypass certificate pinning checks (NCC Group
2014). All of the hubs also communicated with manufacturer and other third-party servers. The
content of this second communication path over the public Internet could not be decrypted in every
case due to the use of TLS and certificate pinning on the hubs themselves.
Along with the difficulties presented by the hubs themselves, accessories essential to the
test provided their own set of challenges. Smart sensors and bulbs refused to pair with the hubs,
or reported failure when they had successfully paired. A lack of thorough documentation for either
hubs or accessories made it difficult to unpair devices once they had been paired. Finally, the only
readily-available devices for sniffing Z-Wave and ZigBee traffic required soldering and
installation of custom firmware before they could be used. A solution utilizing software-defined
radio was suggested, however no one with the proper expertise was available. With so many
difficulties, it is easy to see why security research in this arena is sparse.

3.1.5! Testing the Smart Home Extensions Against Hubs
Testing began after finalizing the pool of testing targets and setting up the test environment. I
performed all testing activities and tracked the results using the spreadsheet contained in the
appendix. This spreadsheet was based on one created by Florent Batard, a French security
researcher that uses the ASVS regularly (Batard 2014). I evaluated each hub using the existing
level one requirements of the ASVS and all of the smart home extensions. If any hubs passed all
of the level one requirements, I would move on to level two requirements. Each hub took an
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average of 10 days to complete the verification testing; resulting in an average of 60 hours spent
evaluating each of the four hubs.

3.2! RQ-1: Determining the Most Prevalent Security Vulnerabilities in Existing Hubs
Once testing was complete, results were compiled to determine what types of
vulnerabilities were most prevalent in the hubs tested. This list was compared to the OWASP IoT
Top 10 List to determine whether the results fit with prevailing ideas on the subject.

3.3! RO-2: Developing Recommendations
Using the knowledge gained from RQ-1 as a guide, I developed recommendations for a more
secure smart home hub. Separate recommendations are mode for end-users and manufacturers.
Existing best practices and applicable standards in this area were taken into account, as well as the
performance of the hubs under evaluation.
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4!

SMART HOME EXTENSIONS FOR THE OWASP ASVS

The following are proposed extensions to the OWASP Application Security Verification
Standard (ASVS). They were developed as extensions to ASVS 2014, also referred to as ASVS
2.0. As discussed in the Methodology section, the requirements that make up these extensions are
based on best practices from related frameworks, standards, and guidance documents.

I

incorporated feedback from nine industry experts in the final draft. The following sections explain
how the extensions changed from the initial draft to the final draft.

4.1! Initial Draft
As detailed in section 3.1.2, the initial draft was based on my personal experience with six
different smart home hubs and an in-depth review of existing best practices from frameworks,
standards, and guidance documents.

References to these documents were included where

applicable. Also included were personal notes on why a requirement was considered important or
questions soliciting feedback on how to clearly phrase an item. As can be seen in the below figure,
the first draft contained three new categories and eight new requirements.
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Table 2 - Initial Draft of the Smart Home Extensions
Category

Verification.Requirement
Verify'that'the'device'supports'the'WPA2''standard'with'AES'encryption.''
If'the'device'acts'as'a'wireless'access'point,'verify'that'WPS'is'disabled'
or'implements'protections'against'bruteAforce'attacks.'

Level.1 Level.2 Level.3
x

x

x

x

x

Verify'that'no'services'are'listening'on'undocumented'ports.''
Wireless

Verify'that'ZAWave'uses'secure'node'authentication.
x
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Verify'that'the'device'uses'Bluetooth'v2.1+'Security'Mode'4'with'3'as'a'
fallback.''Devices'using'Bluetooth'Smart'should'use'Security'Mode'1'
Level'3.''Verify'the'device'is'undiscoverable'except'as'needed'for'pairing.''
Verify'that'a'user'can'backup'and'retain'a'copy'of'the'device'
Verify'that'a'user'can'restore'a'previously'backed'up'configuration.
Data'Backup'
Verify'that'a'user'can'reset'the'device'to'factory'defaults,'either'via'a'
and'Restore
hardware'button'or'through'software.
Verify'that'there'is'a'secure'method'to'update'or'patch'the'system.''This'
Updating'and' may'be'in'the'form'of'userAinitiated'update'functionality'protected'by'
Patching authentication,'or'automatic'updates'over'a'secure'channel'such'as'
HTTPS.''

x
x
x

x
x

x
x

x

x

x

x

x

x

References

Notes

Practical'Verification'of'WPAATKIP'
Vulnerabilities'(VanHoef'2013)

This'could'be'part'of'
Communications.''WPA2'w/TKIP'
can'be'broken,'as'can'
WEP/WPA.
Critical'Security'Control'11:'Limitation'
Phrasing?'This'should'cover'I2C,'
and'Control'of'Network'Ports,'Protocols,' JTAG'or'other'protocols'going'
and'Services
over'wireless.
Still'looking'for'a'ZAWave'security'"Best' This'is'probably'a'"Plus"'level,'as'
Practices"'document.''Does'one'exist'
the'authentication'routine'is'
outside'of'Sigma?
defined'by'Sigma'and/or'libraries'
are'commonly'used.
NIST'Guide'to'BT'Security'A'Security'
This'may'not'be'documented'
Checklist'items'13,'14,'16
and'could'require'sniffing'the'
traffic.
Critical'Security'Control'8:'Data'Recovery'
Critical'Security'Control'8:'Data'Recovery'
Inferred'from'Critical'Security'Control'8:' If'a'device'gets'infected'or'put'
Data'Recovery'Capability
into'a'unresolvable'state,'this'
may'be'the'only'way'to'fix'it.
Critical'Security'Control'4:'Continuous'
Vulnerability'Assessment'and'
Remediation

4.2! Revisions and Final Draft
The three verification categories of Wireless, Data Backup and Restore, and Updating and
Patching changed little through each round of revisions, undergoing only minor name changes.
The Wireless category was renamed to Communication Channels to reflect that wireless standards
are not the only way that hubs communicate. Reviewers suggested two additional categories,
physical security and privacy. Although physical security was considered as a category in the
early development phases, it was decided against for one main reason: an attack scenario against
a smart home hub in which the attacker has physical access to the hub implies that they are already
in the house and can therefore access sensitive data in other ways. The suggestion to add a category
for privacy was compelling, but many of the existing requirements across various categories of the
ASVS touch on privacy issues already. The addition of a separate category that contained
overlapping requirements would unnecessarily complicate the extensions.
Revisions due to feedback from reviewers resulted in 15 separate requirements in the final
draft. For ease of referring to the requirements, I added numbering. In the Communication
Channels category, I received conflicting feedback: some reviewers said the requirements were
not specific enough because they failed to include certain standards, while others said they were
too specific. After some discussion with reviewers, I chose to generalize the requirements. For
example, instead of multiple requirements addressing encryption strength separately for WiFi,
Bluetooth, Z-Wave and others, there is a single requirement, CC.1, which specifies that the device
utilize the currently accepted strongest encryption available for each communication channel.
While this puts more responsibility on the individual or organization performing the testing, it
makes for a set of extensions that can be applied to new technologies without the need to constantly
update the list of requirements.
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In both the Data Backup/Restore and Updating/Patching categories, requirements were
modified so that they better match the risk-based nature of the ASVS. The first requirement in
Data Backup/Restore, for example, originally had the tester “Verify that a user can backup and
retain a copy of the device configuration”. This was a level one requirement, and the only
requirement that touched on backups. After feedback, there are now related requirements for level
two and level three testing in the form of DB.2 and DB.3, respectively.
Finally, the terminology used in many requirements was updated for accuracy based on
feedback. “Hashed checksums” became “cryptographic checksums” in UP.2. In CC.6, language
was added to the requirement to provide context for testers unfamiliar with downgrade attacks.
CC.5 was previously included as part of CC.4, until one reviewer noted that these were unrelated
requirements and should be split apart.
Although the feedback and revisions described here do not constitute a comprehensive
listing of the changes over time, I have included the most significant ones. Further notes can be
found under the column titled “Change notes” on the final draft, shown in figures 1 and 2.

30

Category

Requirement/
Number

CC.1

Communication*Channels

Verification/Requirement

Level/1

Verify*each*communications*channel*used*by*the*device*implements*the*currently*
accepted*strongest*encryption*available.**For*example:*Wi>Fi*should*be*secured*
using*WPA2*and*AES*encryption,*Z>Wave*should*use*secure*node*authentication,*
Bluetooth*2.1+*should*use*security*mode*4*with*3*as*a*fallback,*Bluetooth*Smart*
should*use*security*mode*1*level*3,*and*ZigBee*should*use*the*encryption*security*
service.

Verify*each*communications*channel*used*by*the*device*implements*some*type*
of*encryption.
CC.2

x

Verify*that*previously*paired*devices*authenticate*each*other*upon*reconnecting.
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CC.5
CC.6
DB.1
DB.2
Data*Backup/Restore

Level/3

References

x

NIST*Guide*to*BT*Security*>*Security*Checklist*items*13,*14,*
16*/*Recommended*Practices*Guide:*Securing*ZigBee*
Wireless*Networks*in*Process*Control*System*Environments*>*
DHS*US*CERT*/**NIST*Special*Publication*800>121:*Guide*to*
Bluetooth*Security*/*NIST*Special*Publication*800>97:*
Establishing*Wireless
Robust*Security*Networks:*A*Guide*to*IEEE*802.11i*/*NIST*
Special*Publication*800>48r1:*Guide*to*Securing*Legacy*IEEE*
802.11*Wireless*Networks*/*NIST*Special*Publication*800>
153:*Guidelines*for*Securing*Wireless*Local*Area*Networks*
(WLANs)

x

x

NIST*Guide*to*BT*Security*>*Security*Checklist*items*13,*14,*
16*/*Recommended*Practices*Guide:*Securing*ZigBee*
Wireless*Networks*in*Process*Control*System*
Environments*>*DHS*US*CERT*/**NIST*Special*Publication*
800>121:*Guide*to*Bluetooth*Security

x

x

x

CC.3
CC.4

Level/2

Verify*that*no*services*are*listening*on*undocumented*ports.**

x

x

x

Verify*the*device*is*undiscoverable*with*regard*to*wireless*protocol*pairing*
except*as*needed*for*pairing.
Verify*that*fallback*settings*for*any*protocol*are*at*least*as*secure*as*default*
settings*to*prevent*downgrade*attacks.
Verify*that*a*user*can*backup*and*retain*a*copy*of*the*device*configuration.

x

x

x

x

x

x

x

x

x

x

Verify*that*any*credentials*stored*in*backups*are*encrypted.

DB.3

Verify*that*backups*are*encrypted*and*protected*with*a*passphrase*or*key.

DB.4

Verify*that*a*user*can*restore*a*previously*backed*up*configuration.

x

x

x
x

Verify*that*a*user*can*reset*the*device*to*factory*defaults,*either*via*a*hardware*
button*or*through*software.
Verify*that*there*is*a*secure*method*to*update*or*patch*the*system.**This*may*be*
in*the*form*of*user>initiated*update*functionality*protected*by*authentication,*or*
automatic*updates*over*a*secure*channel*such*as*HTTPS.**

x

x

x

x

x

x

x

x

DB.5
UP.1

UP.2

Verify*that*patches*or*updates*are*integrity>checked*(for*example*with*
a*cryptographic*checksum)*and*delivered*over*a*secure*channel.

UP.3

For*patches*delivered*using*HTTPS,*verify*that*the*application*uses*SSL*pinning.

x

UP.4

Verify*that*patches*or*updates*are*cryptographically*signed*and*
verified*before*being*applied.**Signature*and*verification*should*be*
done*with*a*public/private*key*pair*to*mitigate*the*risk*of*key*
extraction*if*a*symmetric*key*were*used.

x

Updating/Patching
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Critical*Security*Control*11:*Limitation*and*Control*of*
Network*Ports,*Protocols,*and*Services

Critical*Security*Control*8:*Data*Recovery*Capability

Critical*Security*Control*8:*Data*Recovery*Capability
Inferred*from*Critical*Security*Control*8:*Data*Recovery*
Capability
Critical*Security*Control*4:*Continuous*Vulnerability*
Assessment*and*Remediation

Requirement*
Number

Notes

Change*notes

This(could(be(part(of(Communications.((WPA2(w/TKIP(can(
be(broken,(as(can(WEP/WPA

Prior(to(comments(by(Rob(Ragan((3/19/2015)(and(Derek(Hansen((3/24/2015),(
requirements(were(specific(to(each(protocol.((For(generalizability(and(to(ensure(the(
extensions(do(not(become(outdated(quickly,(the(requirements(have(been(updated.

Is(this(already(covered(by(ASVS(10.6:("Verify(that(all(
connections(to(external(systems(that(involve(sensitive(
information(or(functions(are(authenticated"?

Removed("...if(the(protocol(provides(a(mechanism(to(do(so."(per(feedback(by(Ryan(Speers

CC.1

CC.2

CC.3
CC.4
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Split(from(previous(requirement(per(discussion(w/Derek(Hansen

CC.5

Added("...to(prevent(downgrade(attacks"(per(feedback(by(Ryan(Speers.

CC.6
DB.1

Updated(from("hashed"(to("encrypted"(per(feedback(from(Ryan(Speers.((This(is(an(L2(
requirement,(so(encryption(makes(more(sense(than(simply(hashing.((

DB.2
DB.3
DB.4
DB.5

If(a(device(gets(infected(or(put(into(a(unresolvable(state,(
this(may(be(the(only(way(to(fix(it.
Split(into(3(separate(requirements(per(Dale(Rowe

UP.1

UP.2
UP.3

UP.4

Added(per(feedback(by(Dale(Rowe.((Changed("hashed(checksum"(to("cryptographic(
checksum"(per(feedback(by(Ryan(Speers.
Added(per(feedback(by(Aaron(Guzman.

Third(party(CA(used(for(signing.((Better(protection( Added(per(feedback(by(Dale(Rowe.((Updated(to("cryptographically(signed"(per(feedback(by(
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Figure 2 - Final Draft of the Smart Home Extensions Continued

5!

A SECURITY EVALUATION OF FOUR SMART HOME HUBS

To determine the effectiveness of the Smart Home Extensions in evaluating the security of a
hub and to better understand the state of security in existing hubs, four hubs were selected as
described in section 3.1.3. Each hub was evaluated against the level one ASVS requirements and
all requirements, levels one through three, of the Smart Home Extensions. This was done to ensure
that all of the Smart Home Extensions were tested. Although I had planned to perform level two
ASVS verification for any hub that passed level one in all categories, none did so.
The ASVS contains 13 categories of verification requirements, the addition of the Smart
Home Extensions bringing that total to 14.

Restricting evaluation activities to level one

requirements reduces that number to 11, as the Cryptography at Rest, Malicious Controls, and
Business Logic categories contain only level two and level three requirements. Furthermore,
because some hubs did not implement functionality addressed by a requirement, some
requirements were marked “Not Applicable” for a particular hub. For example, requirement V16.3
in the Files and Resources category requires that “files obtained from untrusted sources are
scanned by antivirus scanners to prevent upload of known malicious content.” The Wink HUB,
however, does not provide any file upload functionality. It is for this reason that the overall total
requirements tested for each hub varies slightly. For convenience, any level one requirements
deemed “Not Applicable” are listed on the first page of the testing results spreadsheet for each
hub, included in the appendix.
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5.1! Limitations
It should be noted that evaluation and testing activities that required monitoring Z-Wave
wireless communications was not practical due to hardware problems. Due to the proprietary
nature of Z-Wave, just two avenues are available for sniffing Z-Wave traffic: the Sigma Designs
Z-Wave Development Kit (Sigma Designs Incorporated 2014) or the open source Z-Force Packet
Interception and Injection Tool (Fouladi and Ghanoun 2013). The development kit from Sigma
Designs was prohibitively expensive at a cost of close to $3,000 dollars, so the Z-Force tool was
used instead. The required hardware for this tool was $75 dollars. After over 40 hours of work
preparing the hardware, which included installing custom firmware, soldering on header pins, and
testing on multiple operating systems, I was unable to get the tool to work. Errors reported by the
software could not be traced back to a root cause because, although the z-force tool claims to be
open source, the source code does not appear to be publicly available (“Issue 1 - Z-Force - Project
Marked as Open Source but No Source Provided - Z-Wave Packet Interception and Injection Tool
- Google Project Hosting” 2014).
Another consideration of note is that attacks on servers or devices not owned by me were
specifically out-of-scope. All of the hubs communicated with third-party servers on the public
Internet and this communication was often essential for the proper functioning of a hub. Where
evaluation activities would have required actions that could disrupt or otherwise interfere with outof-scope assets, the verification requirement was skipped and marked as Not Applicable. The
same was done for requirements that could not be verified due to insufficient access to server-side
source code. One example of these is requirement 5.10, which requires testing for SQL injection.
The VeraLite hub does not use a SQL-type database on the device itself, but the manufacturer’s
site with which the hub communicates appears to use one. However, as mentioned previously,
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performing SQL injection attacks against the manufacturer’s site was out of-scope. Consequently,
this verification requirement was marked Not Applicable. All activities falling under this category
have been noted in the original testing notes, contained in the appendix.

5.2! VeraLite Smart Home Controller
The VeraLite Smart Home Controller is produced by Vera Control, Ltd. and was released
in March of 2012. Vera Control releases updates regularly and at the time of testing, the VeraLite
was running the most current version of the firmware, version 1.7.541. The VeraLite supports WiFi and Z-Wave protocols. The hub itself is pictured below:

Figure 3 - The VeraLite Smart Home Controller

5.2.1! Overall Results
The VeraLite Smart Home Controller performed poorly as evaluated by the ASVS with
the Smart Home Extensions. It was the lowest performing hub when measured solely by the
extensions. The hub met all applicable level one requirements in just three of 11 categories.
Looking at the table below, we can see that on average, this hub met less than half of the
requirements in a single category. Moreover, considering the total number of requirements, the
hub met just 19 out of a possible 54, or 35%.
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Table 3 - Overall Evaluation Results for the VeraLite Smart Home Controller
Category
Authentication
Session0Management
Access0Control
Malicious0Input0Handling
Error0Handling0and0Logging
Data0Protection
Communication0Security
HTTP0Security
Files0and0Resources
Mobile
Smart0Home0Extensions
Cryptography0at0Rest
Malicious0Controls
Business0Logic

Overall'Total

Requirements0
Passed
2
3
1
3
1
1
1
0
0
4
3
0
0
0

Requirements0
Tested
8
7
8
6
1
2
1
3
5
4
9
0
0
0

Percent0Passed0
Requirements
25%
43%
13%
50%
100%
50%
100%
0%
0%
100%
33%
N/A
N/A
N/A

19

54

35%

5.2.2! Highlighted Results
Detailed information concerning how the hub performed against each requirement can be
found in the appendix. However, to better illustrate how the hub performed, I have highlighted
selected results here by category.

5.2.2.1! Authentication
Authentication was a particularly weak category for the VeraLite hub. Requirement 2.1
states that “all pages and resources require authentication except those specifically intended to be
public”.

However, with knowledge of the IP address of the hub, a user may browse to

http://<ip_address>/cmh/ and control connected devices without authenticating.

Not all

functionality is available, but a user could turn on and off lights and other appliances, lock and
unlock doors, and arm or disarm door and window sensors.
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If a malicious user wanted further control over the hub, testing for requirements 2.4 and
2.16 showed that communication with the hub was sent over unencrypted links, leaving credentials
exposed to any attacker eavesdropping on the network. Furthermore, session variables stored in
cookies were not expired after a user logged out, allowing me to reuse old values for MMSAuth
and MMSAuthSig to successfully authenticate. In such a case, an attacker does not even need to
observe the initial authentication; they simply need to steal a recent cookie.
Other problems with authentication included new passwords sent in plaintext via email
(2.17), the ability to enumerate accounts using the account registration functionality (2.18), and
the use of a hardcoded, shared username and password for accessing the publicly available log
server (2.19).

5.2.2.2! Access Control
The VeraLite passed only one of eight requirements under Access Control. The one it did
pass was 4.5, the requirement to disable directory browsing unless deliberately desired. However,
this success is partially undercut by the failure to pass 4.5, which requires protection against direct
object references. In practice, this means that although an attacker cannot see a directory listing,
that attacker can see the contents of any file if they know the name and location of it. Additionally,
failure to meet requirements in the Access Control category resulted in vulnerabilities such as local
file inclusion (4.3), arbitrary file uploads (4.1), and cross-site request forgery (4.16).

5.2.3! Smart Home Extensions Results
Under the Smart Home Extensions, the VeraLite passed three out of a possible nine
requirements. Significantly, all three requirements that were met were in the Data Backup/Restore
category, with the hub not meeting any of the requirements in the Communications Channel or
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Updating/Patching categories. The requirements that were met, DB.1, DB.4, and DB.5, are all
functional requirements, which show that the hub can be backed up, restored, or reset to factory
defaults. These functions are important in the case of a hub becoming infected by a virus or taken
over by a malicious party. In such a case, the only recourse may be a factory reset and restore.
All but one of the failed requirements concerns encryption, potentially making it easier for
an attacker to obtain sensitive information that would allow them to take over a hub. The final
failed requirement, CC.4, requires that “no services are listening on undocumented ports”. At the
time of writing, no documentation was available from Vera Control Ltd. that described what
services were listening on which ports. As will be seen, and further discussed in chapter seven,
this was the case with all of the hubs.

5.3! Wink HUB
Wink was originally developed by Quirky, Inc. as an application for smart phones to
control smart home devices. The ecosystem of supported devices grew, and in July of 2014, the
Wink HUB was released (Quirky Inc. 2014). Quirky releases regular updates and to both the
firmware for the hub and to the companion smart phone application. At the time of testing, the
hub firmware was version 0.86.0 and the application version was 3.0.5.2. The Wink HUB supports
Wi-Fi, Z-Wave, ZigBee, Bluetooth LE, Lutron ClearConnect, and the Kidde protocol. The hub
itself is pictured below:
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Figure 4 - The Wink HUB

5.3.1! Overall Results
The Wink HUB performed well against the ASVS with the Smart Home Extensions. It
was the highest-performing hub as measured solely by the extensions. It was also the only hub to
meet 100% of the applicable requirements in seven of the 11 categories, the highest of any hub
evaluated. Referring to the table below, we can see that the Wink HUB never scored less than
50% in a category. When looking at the total number of requirements, the hub met 74%, a
significant difference from the 35% of the VeraLite, and the second most secure hub as measured
by that metric.
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Table 4 - Overall Evaluation Results for the Wink HUB
Category
Authentication
Session0Management
Access0Control
Malicious0Input0Handling
Error0Handling0and0Logging
Data0Protection
Communication0Security
HTTP0Security
Files0and0Resources
Mobile
Smart0Home0Extensions
Cryptography0at0Rest
Malicious0Controls
Business0Logic

Overall'Total

Requirements0
Passed
5
2
4
6
1
2
1
2
2
4
6
0
0
0

Requirements0
Tested
8
4
8
6
1
2
1
2
2
4
9
0
0
0

Percent0Passed0
Requirements
63%
50%
50%
100%
100%
100%
100%
100%
100%
100%
67%
N/A
N/A
N/A

35

47

74%

5.3.2! Highlighted Results
The most notable result from the evaluation of the Wink HUB is that it passed all applicable
requirements in so many categories. This may be due, in part, to the fact that Quirky participates
in a bug bounty program for the hub (Quirky Inc. 2015a). This is a program whereby independent
security researchers may receive payment for discovering and submitting security bugs to Quirky.
This type of program can effectively expand the security QA team of a company, and this may be
the reason that the Wink HUB is so secure in some areas.
Detailed information concerning how the hub performed against each requirement can be
found in the appendix. However, to better illustrate how the hub performed, I have highlighted
selected results here by category.
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5.3.2.1! Authentication, Session Management, and Access Control
The Wink HUB failed requirements in four categories. One was Smart Home Extensions,
which will be addressed presently. Failures in the other three categories, Authentication, Session
Management, and Access Control, are related because nearly all of the failures are due to the
implementation of the open authentication standard OAUTH 2.0. Quirky’s implementation of this
standard relies on a bearer token to verify that every action is authorized. Testing showed that if
an attacker were to steal a bearer token, they could perform any action on the hub, including
deleting the user account, potentially causing a denial of service condition. This would mean that
the valid user could not control any of their smart devices until the hub had been restored to factory
defaults. As discussed in the following section, such a restoration is difficult to perform.

5.3.3! Smart Home Extensions Results
The Wink HUB performed admirably on many of the Smart Home Extensions, passing
67% of the requirements. While it still supports weak encryption in some areas, which could leave
it vulnerable to downgrade attacks, in the Communication Channel subcategory it generally
performed well. Where it fell short was in the subcategory of Data Backup/Restore. The findings
here were not discovered by any existing requirements in the ASVS, demonstrating the
effectiveness of the Smart Home Extensions.
As mentioned previously, one particular attack performed during testing left the hub in an
unusable state. Important functionality was inaccessible to the primary user, as the account had
been deleted in a simulated attack. Without access to a secondary user, such an attack could
prevent the owner from controlling their smart home devices without a factory reset.
Unfortunately, the Wink HUB has no factory reset functionality, as required by DB.5. In such a
scenario, it is likely that fixing the hub would require a call to Wink HUB support.
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A closely related issue is addressed by DB.1 and DB.4. These requirements state that a
device should have both a backup and a restore functionality, so that user-defined configurations
can be saved. The importance of these is best illustrated by referring to the previously mentioned
attack. Let us suppose that a user has installed smart light switches on the main floor, smart bulbs
in bedrooms, smart locks on the front and back door, a smart thermostat, and connected cameras
covering the front and back doors. This setup could consist of anywhere between 10 and 20
devices. If a user loses access to their account through means malicious or accidental, or the hub
undergoes a factory reset, that user will be forced to add each device once again, a process that
may take hours. Allowing users to back up and restore their settings would significantly diminish
the impact of such an attack.

5.4! SmartThings Hub
The SmartThings Hub is made by SmartThings Inc. and has been available since August
2013. Updates to the hub firmware and related smart-phone application are done on a regular
basis, with updates to the hub pushed out automatically. During testing, the hub firmware was
version 000.011.00705 and the Android application version was 1.7.0. The SmartThings Hub
supports Wi-Fi, Z-Wave, ZigBee, and WeMo devices. The hub itself is pictured below:
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Figure 5 - The SmartThings Hub

5.4.1! Overall Results
The SmartThings Hub performed fairly well against the ASVS with the Smart Home
Extensions, although similar to the VeraLite, it failed all requirements in two categories. It was
the second-highest-performing hub when measured solely by the extensions, and third for overall
requirements. This hub was also the only one to meet 100% of the applicable requirements in the
Authentication category.

5.4.2! Highlighted Results
As mentioned previously, detailed information concerning how the hub performed against
each requirement can be found in the appendix. Selected results are highlighted below.
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Table 5 - Overall Evaluation Results for the SmartThings Hub
Category
Authentication
Session0Management
Access0Control
Malicious0Input0Handling
Error0Handling0and0Logging
Data0Protection
Communication0Security
HTTP0Security
Files0and0Resources
Mobile
Smart0Home0Extensions
Cryptography0at0Rest
Malicious0Controls
Business0Logic

Overall0Total

Requirements0
Passed
8
5
5
5
0
1
1
0
4
4
5
0
0
0

Requirements0
Tested
8
7
7
7
1
2
1
3
4
4
9
0
0
0

Percent0Passed0
Requirements
100%
71%
71%
71%
0%
50%
100%
0%
100%
100%
56%
N/A
N/A
N/A
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53

72%

5.4.2.1! Authentication
The SmartThings hub was the only one of those tested to score 100% in the Authentication
category. Given the importance of authentication in the context of a device that can control your
home, it is surprising that this was the only hub to pass all of the requirements in this category. It
was discovered during testing that SmartThings utilizes the Spring Framework (Pivotal Software
2015). This widely-used Java framework includes an authentication and authorization module,
which may explain why the SmartThings Hub did so well in this area.

5.4.2.2! Error Handling and Logging
The failure in Error Handling and Logging, requirement 8.1, states that the application
should not output error messages containing sensitive data. In testing, I was able to get the
application to output error messages that included information about function names, the
framework in use, service versions, and an IP address for an internal server. While this information
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is sensitive in the sense that it can help an attacker carry out further attacks, none of it is inherently
sensitive or problematic on its own.

5.4.2.3! HTTP Security
The failure to pass requirements 11.2 and 11.3 in HTTP Security is similarly low risk.
These requirements concern, respectively, only allowing specific HTTP methods while blocking
others, and the inclusion of content-type headers. The failure to comply with 11.2 is little more
than incorrect documentation, as the response to an OPTIONS request states that TRACE is
allowed, when it is not. 11.3 is a bit more concerning, as some pages do not include a correct
content-type header, and could therefore be used in attacks against the browser. This risk is
partially mitigated by the fact that only a small number of pages fail to return a correct contenttype header.

5.4.3! Smart Home Extensions Results
Evaluating the SmartThings Hub against the Smart Home Extensions turned up results
similar to the Wink HUB. There is no backup or restore functionality, although a factory reset is
possible through a hardware button. In the case of the SmartThings Hub, the lack of backup or
restore functionality is less of a risk because the hub does not have the same account deletion
vulnerability. However, if a user wants to replace their hub while keeping all of the same devices
associated, or replicate their current setup, the inability to backup and restore a configuration
makes these things impossible.
The SmartThings Hub did well in other areas of the Smart Home Extensions, although
fallback settings were not nearly as secure as the default settings for many protocols. This was
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common among all of the hubs, and suggests that downgrade attacks are less well known, or that
compatibility is being put before security.

5.5! Staples Connect Hub
The Staples Connect Hub is a home automation hub marketed by the office supply
company Staples. It relies on a home automation platform provided by Zonoff, Inc., a company
which specializes in home automation software. The Staples Connect Hub was first released in
the Fall of 2013, with a device manufactured by Linksys. One year later, a newer version of the
hub was released with a different design, and this time manufactured by D-Link. The D-Link hub,
pictured below, was the one used in this evaluation. The D-Link Staples Connect Hub supports
Wi-Fi, Z-Wave, ZigBee, Lutron Clear Connect, and Bluetooth LE protocols. The Android
application version tested was 1.7. There was not a way to discover the version of the firmware
in use.

5.5.1! Overall Results
Based on percent passed requirements, the Connect is the most secure of all hubs reviewed.
However, when judged solely by the Smart Home Extensions, the Connect was second overall. It
scored 60% or above in all categories. The most significant result is not that the hub performed
particularly well or poor in a single category, but that it performed fairly well in all categories.
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Figure 6 - The Staples Connect Hub

5.5.2!

Highlighted Results

Given that the Connect Hub performed so well in all categories, it is important to
understand the impact of those requirements it did not meet. I have highlighted these briefly,
below. For detailed information regarding testing procedures and individual requirements, please
refer to the appendix.

5.5.2.1! Authentication
In the Authentication category, the Connect failed to meet requirement 2.18 regarding
protection against user enumeration. User enumeration is the act of collecting a list of, or
enumerating, the valid users of an application. Once an attacker has a list of valid users, it can be
used to perform various attacks including mass denial-of-service and horizontal password brute
forcing. Depending on the company, user enumeration may be considered a significant risk or a
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non-issue. As seen in figure 7, the email addresses of Connect users can be enumerated through
the password reset functionality.

Table 6 - Overall Evaluation Results for the Staples Connect Hub
Category

Authentication
Session0Management
Access0Control
Malicious0Input0Handling
Error0Handling0and0Logging
Data0Protection
Communication0Security
HTTP0Security
Files0and0Resources
Mobile
Smart0Home0Extensions
Cryptography0at0Rest
Malicious0Controls
Business0Logic

Overall0Total

Requirements0
Passed

Requirements0
Tested

Percent0Passed0
Requirements

7
6
6
4
1
2
1
2
3
4
5
0
0
0

8
7
8
5
1
2
1
3
3
4
8
0
0
0

88%
86%
75%
80%
100%
100%
100%
67%
100%
100%
63%
N/A
N/A
N/A
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Figure 7- Password Reset Message for the Connect Hub
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82%

5.5.2.2! Access Control
The Connect Hub failed two requirements under Access Control: 4.4 and 4.16. The first
is a requirement to protect against direct object references. The hub fails this requirement because
it is possible, via direct object reference, to access user-interface items that are meant to be hidden.
This can be seen in the screenshot below. While this failing does not appear to have any security
implications in this instance, it suggests that the application designers did not consider this attack
vector. If that is the case, this may be a problem with greater security implications elsewhere in
the application.

Figure 8 - Interface Items Not Intended for Staples Connect Users were Disclosed via
Direct Object Reference

49

The second requirement, 4.16, requires anti-CSRF tokens for all high value transactions.
Zonoff uses websocket requests for communication between their servers and the Connect Hub,
and no anti-CSRF tokens are included in these requests. For this reason, the Connect Hub did not
meet the requirement. Furthermore, testing indicated that the application may be vulnerable to
cross-site websocket hijacking attacks (Schneider 2013), a more concerning problem than the
previously mentioned direct object reference.

5.5.2.3! Malicious Input Handling
Under the Malicious Input Handling category, the Connect failed just one requirement.
That requirement, 5.5, states that all input validation or encoding routines must be performed and
enforced on the server. By intercepting and modifying a websocket request to change the name of
a door sensor, I was able to bypass the client-side restrictions on length. While this particular
attack had no direct security implications, insufficient server-side input validation can lead to other
vulnerabilities such as injection flaws and cross-site scripting.

5.5.3! Smart Home Extensions
In this category, the Connect performed similar to other hubs. A lack of documentation
meant that it was impossible to tell if there was anything suspicious among the four open ports
(443, 10010, 33791, and 50002) detected in an nmap scan. And fallback settings for SSL still
included the cryptographically weak RC4 and MD5 suites, leaving the hub’s communications
vulnerable to downgrade attacks.
Similar to both the Wink and SmartThings hubs, the Connect does not allow a user to make
a backup of their configuration settings. This leaves it open to the same problem suffered by the
SmartThings hub if an account were maliciously or accidentally deleted – significant loss of time
50

for the end user in re-establishing the network of smart devices. Fortunately, the Connect does
have a way for a user to perform a factory reset, mitigating the risk of the hub becoming stuck in
an unusable state.

5.6! Summary
The below graphs and charts highlight some similarities and differences among the four
hubs. Figure 9 shows that all hubs did well in both Mobile and Communication Security, with all
hubs passing 100% of applicable requirements. Conversely, all hubs had problems with Session
Management, Access Control, and the Smart Home Extensions, with none of the hubs able to meet
100% of the requirements. In addition, in the HTTP Security category neither the VeraLite nor
the SmartThings hubs were able to pass a single requirement. Exact percentages are displayed in
Table 8 for convenience. Further visual comparison can be made with Figures 10 through 13,
which are included below.
Table 7 shows that the Wink scored the highest in the greatest number of categories,
followed closely by the Connect. Going by this table, it is clear that the VeraLite performed the
worst. Investigating this further by referring to Figure 9, we see that the VeraLite hub failed to
outperform another hub in any category.

Table 7 - Highest Rated Hubs

Highest*Rated*in*
a*Category
VeraLite
3
Wink
8
SmartThings
4
Connect
7
Hub
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Figure 9 - Percentage of Requirements Met by Category for All Hubs

Table 8 - Percentage of Requirements Met by Category for All Hubs
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Table 9 shows the performance of each hub as measured by the Smart Home Extensions,
by requirement. As this table makes clear, I was not able to test requirements CC.3, UP.2, and
UP.4. This was due to the limitations mentioned previously in Section 5.1. What stands out here
is that all of the hubs had trouble with requirement CC.6, which is the requirement that covers
fallback settings for encrypted connections. Although the VeraLite did not fail this requirement,
that hub did not implement encryption, leaving it possibly more vulnerable than the hubs that
failed the requirement.
The other result of note is each hub’s result for DB.1, which requires that a user can
backup and retain a copy of the device configuration. The VeraLite hub was the only one to
provide this functionality. The potential impact of not providing this has been covered
previously. This also explains why the other hubs were not evaluated against DB.2, DB.3, or
DB.4, as those requirements depend upon DB.1.
Finally, I was only able to verify requirement UP.3 with the Wink HUB. This
requirement states that for patches delivered using SSL, the application should utilize certificate
pinning. Without access to source code or debug logs on the devices, it was impossible to know
whether certificate pinning was being used. However, during the testing window the SSL
certificate for the Wink HUB expired, resulting in an unusable hub (Quirky Inc. 2015b). Due to
the nature of the failure and the manufacturer’s suggested fix, I was able to infer that SSL
certificate pinning was used on the Wink.
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Table 9 - Hub Performance on Smart Home Extensions
Requirement

CC.1
CC.2
CC.3
CC.4
CC.5
CC.6

VeraLite
Fail
Fail
N/A
Fail
N/A
N/A

Wink
Pass
Pass
N/A
Pass
Pass
Fail

SmartThings
Pass
Pass
N/A
Fail
Pass
Fail

Connect
Pass
Pass
N/A
Fail
Pass
Fail

DB.1
DB.2
DB.3
DB.4
DB.5

Pass
Fail
Fail
Pass
Pass

Fail
N/A
N/A
N/A
Fail

Fail
N/A
N/A
N/A
Pass

Fail
N/A
N/A
N/A
Pass

UP.1
UP.2
UP.3
UP.4

Fail
N/A
N/A
N/A

Pass
N/A
Pass
N/A

Pass
N/A
N/A
N/A

Pass
N/A
N/A
N/A
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Figure 10 - Percentage of Requirements Met by Category for the VeraLite Smart Home
Controller

Figure 11 - Percentage of Requirements Met by Category for the Wink HUB
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Figure 12 - Percentage of Requirements Met by Category for the SmartThings Hub

Figure 13 - Percentage of Requirements Met by Category for the Staples Connect Hub
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6!

RECOMMENDATIONS FOR SMART HOME HUB SECURITY

The following are my recommendations for a more secure smart home hub. Separate
recommendations have been developed for end-users and hub manufacturers in the smart home
arena. All of the recommendations are based on my research into existing best practices and the
results of performing a security evaluation of four smart home hubs, described previously.

6.1! Recommendations for End-Users
1)! Utilize Your Wireless Router’s Guest Network Functionality if Available. Many of the
vulnerabilities discovered during the evaluation of the hubs require an attacker to be on the
same network as the hub to exploit. If friends, family, or neighbors request access to your
wireless network, give them access to the guest network, not the network containing the hub
and other smart devices. Use a different password for your regular network and the guest
network.
2)! Use the Strongest Available Modern Encryption Scheme to Secure your Wireless
Network. At the time of writing, this is WPA2-PSK with AES or WPA2-Enterprise with a
Radius server. All other options at the time or writing have proven weaknesses, making it
easier for an attacker to obtain access to your wireless network. If your router offers it,
disable WPS PIN-based access.
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3)! Use Strong Passwords and Change Default Passwords. Make sure the passwords on your
wireless network and hub are long and complex. Passwords should be a minimum of 12
characters long and contain a mix of upper- and lower-case letters, numbers, and special
characters. Change any passwords that shipped with a device, or that you did not create
yourself.

6.2! Recommendations for Hub Manufacturers
1)! Perform a Comprehensive Security Review of the Hub. If the hub is still under
development, security requirements should be part of the design and functional
specifications. Security should also be integrated into the entire development lifecycle of the
product. Perform a penetration test against the hub prior to release. These activities should
include a security review of any third-party services which the hub relies upon for operation.
If the hub has already been released, perform a penetration test against the hub. If
security expertise is not available within the organization, hire a third party who is familiar
with these types of assessments or consider a bug bounty program.
2)! Consider Using an Existing Standard or Framework for Sensitive Functionality. This
includes authentication, authorization, session management, input validation, cryptography,
output encoding/escaping, error handling and logging, data protection, and communication
security. Using existing standards and frameworks, you leverage the security knowledge and
experience of others to improve the security of your product. It can also help you lower
R&D risks and costs, provide transparency to prospective customers, and avoid duplication
of work.
3)! Ensure that your Hub has Back-Up, Restore, and Factory Reset Functionality. In the
event that a hub is compromised – whether through malicious hacking, malware, or data
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corruption – it is important that a customer be able to reset and, if possible, restore their
previous settings.
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7!

DISCUSSION

7.1! Evaluation of the Extensions
Evaluating the Smart Home Extensions can be done by ensuring they are not flawed, and by
asking how well they provided insight into the security posture of the hubs. I tested them for flaws
in two ways. First, as described in section 3.1.2, industry experts reviewed the requirements and
they were then updated to reflect feedback. Second, by attempting to verify the requirements, I
was able to confirm that it was possible to pass or fail a requirement. As mentioned previously,
all hubs failed some requirements, and they did not all fail the same ones. Likewise, they did not
all pass the same requirements. This can be seen by referring back to Table 9 in section 5.6. These
results suggest that the requirements are not flawed, in that they are not impossible to pass or
impossible to fail.
As has been mentioned already, three extension requirements went untested: CC.3, UP.2,
and UP.4.

CC.3 requires that previously paired devices re-authenticate each other upon

reconnecting. This requirement could not be tested due to insufficient testing hardware. A
RZUSBSTICK (Atmel Corporation 2008) running the killerbee framework (Wright 2011) was
used to sniff traffic. However, what did not come out in preliminary research was that ZigBee
devices can perform channel hopping among 16 channels, changing channels with each message.
An ideal testing environment would contain 16 RZUSBSTICK devices, one to monitor each
channel. Without such a setup, I was unable to capture the necessary traffic to confirm this
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requirement. However, I was able to capture traffic, indicating that with the right tools CC.3 could
be verified.
UP.2 and UP.4 concern cryptographically verifying patches or updates. Because this sort
of verification was done on the device itself, testing would have required access to source code,
which was not available. Alternatively, a patch could have been intercepted and tampered with,
then sent on to the hub. If the patch was applied even after tampering, it could be inferred that the
hub does not perform cryptographic verification, or that the implementation is flawed.
Unfortunately, no patching or update activity was observed during the testing window. Given
access to source code, it is reasonable to believe that these requirements could be verified.
The summary of findings, below, details how well the Smart Home Extensions provided
insight into the security posture of hubs.

7.2! Summary of Findings and Significance of Appendix
None of the hubs evaluated passed all of the security requirements, and testing showed that
every hub had some security vulnerabilities, some of them previously unknown or undisclosed.
The majority of the security vulnerabilities can be considered low to medium risk; however, more
severe vulnerabilities included local file inclusion, which resulted in obtaining the root password
hash, and cross-site scripting.

Furthermore, not a single hub was able to pass all of the

requirements in the Smart Home Extensions. This is not surprising given that no hub passed all
of the ASVS level one requirements, and the extensions include requirements for levels two and
three. The most significant security vulnerabilities discovered in each hub, along with the related
ASVS or Smart Home Extension requirement, are summarized in the table below. More
information on each vulnerability, as well as a complete log of testing results, is in the appendix.
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The ‘Further Details’ column identifies the spreadsheet file, worksheet and requirement number
to reference for this information.

Table 10 - Table of References for Hub Vulnerabilities
Hub

Vulnerability-Type

Further-Details

VeraLite-Smart-Home-Controller Authentication+bypass
Session+reuse
Session+reuse
Local+file+include+3+originally+demonstrated+by+Xipiter+(2014)
Local+file+include+3+originally+demonstrated+by+Xipiter+(2014)
Log+disclosure
File+upload+unprotected+by+authentication
Account+enumeration
Open+redirect
Insufficient+documentation
Wink-HUB
Passwords+stored+in+plaintext
Sensitive+information+disclosure
Insufficient+reset/restore+functionality
Insufficient+reset/restore+functionality
Staples-Connect-Hub
Account+enumeration
Insecure+cookies
Direct+object+reference
Insufficient+documentation
SmartThings-Hub
Sensitive+information+disclosure
Sensitive+information+disclosure
Cross3site+scripting
Insufficient+documentation

Appendix+B+3+VeraLite.xlsx+|+2+3+Authentication+|+V2.1
Appendix+B+3+VeraLite.xlsx+|+2+3+Authentication+|+V2.4
Appendix+B+3+VeraLite.xlsx+|+3+3+Session+Management+|+V3.2
Appendix+B+3+VeraLite.xlsx+|+4+3+Access+Control+|+V4.3
Appendix+B+3+VeraLite.xlsx+|+16+3+Files+and+Resources+|+V16.2
Appendix+B+3+VeraLite.xlsx+|+2+3+Authentication+|+V2.19
Appendix+B+3+VeraLite.xlsx+|+16+3+Files+and+Resources+|+V16.5
Appendix+B+3+VeraLite.xlsx+|+2+3+Authentication+|+V2.18
Appendix+B+3+VeraLite.xlsx+|+16+3+Files+and+Resources+|+V16.1
Appendix+B+3+VeraLite.xlsx+|+Smart+Home+Extensions+|+CC.4
Appendix+B+3+Wink.xlsx+|+2+3+Authentication+|+V2.16
Appendix+B+3+Wink.xlsx+|+4+3+Access+Control+|+V4.5
Appendix+B+3+Wink.xlsx+|+Smart+Home+Extensions+|+DB.1
Appendix+B+3+Wink.xlsx+|+Smart+Home+Extensions+|+DB.5
Appendix+B+3+Staples+Connect.xlsx+|+2+3+Authentication+|+V2.18
Appendix+B+3+Staples+Connect.xlsx+|+3+3+Session+Management+|+V3.15
Appendix+B+3+Staples+Connect.xlsx+|+4+3+Access+Control+|+V4.4
Appendix+B+3+Staples+Connect.xlsx+|+Smart+Home+Extensions+|+CC.4
Appendix+B+3+SmartThings.xlsx+|+3+3+Session+Management+|+V3.6
Appendix+B+3+SmartThings.xlsx+|+8+3+Error+Handling+and+Logging+|8.1
Appendix+B+3+SmartThings.xlsx+|+5+3+Malicious+Input+Handling+|+V5.16
Appendix+B+3+SmartThings.xlsx+|+Smart+Home+Extensions+|+CC.4

These results show that the OWASP Application Security Verification Standard combined
with the Smart Home Extensions can be used to discover previously unknown security
vulnerabilities, providing critical insight into the security posture of a smart home hub. If hub
manufacturers used these tools to assess and mitigate risks, both hub manufacturers and users
would be better off.
The results of the security evaluation suggest that the level of security in the current crop
of smart home hubs varies widely, and in some cases may put users’ possessions, data, and safety
at risk. As detailed in chapter two, a number of security standards and guides exist that could be
applied to smart home hubs. While none of them completely addresses the functionality of hubs,
the proposed Smart Home Extension to the ASVS may fill that gap in coverage, as shown by this
body of research. Whether hub manufacturers select this or another method, there are resources
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available to improve the security of smart home hubs. In a market where users are entrusting
device manufacturers with the keys to their homes, failing to implement best practices is
irresponsible.

7.3! Hub Rankings
Although the purpose of this research was not to determine which of the hubs was the most
secure, the question deserves to be addressed. Regarding this question, it must be noted that
security in this context is application-specific. As explained by security researcher Brenda
Larcom, “What one stakeholder thinks is the very nature of security may be unimportant to
another.” (Larcom 2015). Depending on the context of use, certain vulnerabilities may be
considered severe, or of negligible risk. The hub rankings discussed here are based solely on the
performance of each device as measured by the ASVS and Smart Home Extensions.
Based on the total number of requirements met, the Staples Connect Hub is the most secure
hub, meeting 41 requirements. Because not all hubs offered the same set of features, not all
requirements applied to all hubs. For this reason, the percent of passed requirements was also
calculated. The Connect also came in first as measured by this metric, with 82% passed.
The Wink HUB was the second most secure by percent passed requirements, at 74%, but
was beat out by the SmartThings in total number of requirements met, with 35 versus 38 for the
SmartThings. As will be explained shortly, however, this metric is somewhat misleading. When
measured solely by the Smart Home Extensions, the Wink performed the best, with the Connect a
close second.
While the SmartThings Hub did beat out the Wink in total number of requirements met, it
was third in the majority of metrics highlighted here. Where the SmartThings did stand out was
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in the Authentication category. As mentioned in chapter five, it was the only hub to pass 100% of
the requirements in that category.
The VeraLite performed very poorly overall. While it passed 100% of requirements in
three categories, it did not outperform another hub in a single category. Here I would like to
highlight again that security in this context is application-specific. The VeraLite offers many
customization options, going so far as to allow a user to upload and run their own LUA scripts to
define interactions with smart devices that are not yet officially supported. Some users may
prioritize that functionality above other security controls. Neither the ASVS nor the Smart Home
Extensions account for this. Nevertheless, when it comes to implementing best practices, the
VeraLite falls short.
I mentioned previously that the SmartThings hub met more requirements than the Wink
HUB, but that this metric could be misleading. Figure 14 shows the distribution of passed
requirements across categories for each hub. Comparing the graph for the Wink with that for
SmartThings, we see that the greater number of requirements met by the SmartThings were in a
smaller number of categories.

This figure also illustrates that Authentication, Session

Management, Access Control, and Malicious Input were a problem for the majority of hubs, as
can be seen by observing the top-left quadrant of each graph. Looking at the top-right, we see that
no hub did particularly well when it came to the Smart Home Extensions.
This figure also shows that the results for the Connect and the Wink were very similar.
The overall security of each might be considered comparable if one were to go solely off
percentages and graphs. However, the type of vulnerabilities found in each hub could have widely
differing impacts depending on the environment. This is another case where context matters.
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Figure 14 - Distribution of Passed Requirements Across Categories for Each Hub

7.4! Design Issues
Many design issues were encountered during setup and testing of the hubs that have low
security impact, but are worth highlighting nonetheless. For example, when associating a Z-Wave
or ZigBee device with a hub, the device must be within wireless range of the hub to communicate.
Later, when the device is in its permanent location, perhaps in an upstairs light socket, it does not
itself need to be within range of the hub, as long as it has a route to the hub through the mesh
network. However, some devices cannot easily be relocated. To associate with a mesh networking
device that is out of range, some hubs can run off of batteries for a short period of time. Hubs that
do not have this ability must be shut down and moved to a location where they can associate with
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the new device, then moved back to the original location. It may seem like a small issue, but
disabling the entire smart home network for a time is a security risk, not to mention a usability
problem.
A design issue mentioned previously is the lack of a factory reset on some devices. After
setting up the Wink HUB on a particular wireless network, it was determined that testing would
have to be done in a different location, and therefore on a different wireless network.
Unfortunately, the Wink provided no way to disassociate from the current wireless network and
no way to perform a factory reset. The only way of getting the hub into setup mode was to be outof-range of the associated wireless network for a period of 5 minutes or more. Due to the extensive
coverage of the wireless network to which the Wink had been joined, a faraday cage had to be
used to get it out-of-range of the network. A factory reset button would have saved significant
time and effort.
One issue for potential hub users is the extensive reliance on third-party servers. Every
hub evaluated here requires access to the Internet, not just for convenience, but also as a
requirement for proper functioning of the hub. Users are authenticated using the manufacturer’s
servers, meaning that any outage which prevented the hub from contacting those servers would
prevent users from using their smart devices. One can imagine a situation in which thousands of
users are locked out of their homes because a malicious group launched a denial-of-service attack
against the authentication servers for the Staples Connect.
With the market still in its early stages, these types of issues are mostly minor
inconveniences for a handful of users. However, as the market grows, so too will the impact of
poor design decisions. Hub manufacturers would do well to consider these issues when designing
a hub and users would do well to stay informed of the risks they accept when choosing one.
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7.5! Limitations of Findings
The findings discussed here rely on certain assumptions that should be taken into account
when considering their impact. Furthermore, testing activities were restricted by time, privacy,
and legal concerns.

7.5.1! Network Access
All tests were performed under the assumption that the attacker was on the same network
as the target device. For home wireless networks, this assumption is strengthened by the existence
of vulnerabilities affecting WEP, WPA, and WPA2 w/TKIP encryption schemes, as well as WPS
PIN-based access. Tools available to exploit these vulnerabilities include reaver-wps, wifite,
Aircrack-ng, and more.

7.5.2! Black-Box Testing
Testing was performed under black-box conditions.

This means that no privileged

knowledge of the hubs, associated applications, or source code was available. I assume that an
attacker would be working under similar constraints. However, privileged knowledge or insider
access to source code and other details of a hub could result in more significant risks than those
discovered by this research.

7.5.3! Time
The evaluation of hubs was time-constrained to an estimated 80 hours per hub. This time
included setup of tools and understanding how a hub was expected to function. With more time,
further vulnerabilities may have been discovered. A motivated attacker would likely not be under
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the same time constraints, and could dedicate more time to discovering and exploiting
vulnerabilities, perhaps months.

7.5.4! Legal and Privacy Constraints
Some potential attacks were not performed because they were illegal or unethical. For
example, all of the hubs communicated with the manufacturer’s servers, and many communicated
with other third-party servers. Attacks against third-party servers were out-of-scope, and attacks
against manufacturer servers were limited to those only likely to affect my own accounts, for
privacy and legal reasons. Denial-of-service, social engineering, brute-force, and similar attacks
were therefore out-of-scope. A real-world attacker would not operate under the same constraints,
and therefore might find more vulnerabilities.

7.6! Limitations of the Smart Home Extensions
The Smart Home Extensions also have certain limitations inherent in their design. Known
limitations are documented here.

7.6.1! Physical Security
Evaluating the physical security of the hubs was specifically out-of-scope for the purposes
of this research. The assumption driving this is that an attacker that has physical access to a hub
is likely already in the home and can access sensitive data in other ways.

7.6.2! Privacy
Multiple reviewers brought up the concern that the Smart Home Extensions do not have a
category for privacy. There are two main reasons for this. First, many of the existing requirements
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across various categories of the ASVS touch on privacy issues already. This includes requirements
regarding account enumeration, verbose error messages, and the use of encryption, to name a few.
Attempting to enumerate all potential privacy issues would result in overlap with existing
requirements and likely serve to confuse users.
The second reason privacy was left for other researchers is that the ASVS is an application
security standard, not a privacy standard. While privacy is a major issue in the field of smart
homes and the Internet of Things as a whole, the Smart Home Extensions are designed to extend
the security requirements of the ASVS to cover smart home hubs. Depending on the context,
privacy and security may be opposing goals, a problem which the ASVS is not designed to address.

7.6.3! Expertise and Tools
Evaluating a device or application according to the requirements contained in the ASVS
requires no specific tools other than a computer and an understanding of each requirement. Due
to the protocols involved, an evaluation involving the requirements of the Smart Home Extensions
may require specialized tools. This includes antennas and monitoring tools for Wi-Fi, Bluetooth,
Z-Wave, ZigBee, Insteon ClearConnect, and other protocols and technologies. Not all of the tools
are widely available, and as I experienced, some of the tools are unreliable. This potential
limitation should be resolved prior to beginning testing activities.

7.7! Intended Application of the Smart Home Extensions
The Smart Home Extensions are designed to evaluate the security of smart home hubs in
tandem with the ASVS. It is expected that Security or QA personnel who are interested in
evaluating a smart home hub will use them. Because they are an extension to the ASVS, they are
only meant to be used with it. Considered on their own, they are incomplete.
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It is possible that the extensions and the ASVS as a whole could be used to evaluate the
security of other smart devices. Before pursuing this course, it would be necessary to determine
what functionality the device or class of devices in question offered. By comparing this to what
is covered by the ASVS and the Smart Home Extensions, once could start to understand how well
the they might work in evaluating the product. More work would have to go into the preparation
and adaptation of the requirements, but much of the methodology has been laid out here.

7.8! Future Work
The leading smart home hubs on the market today are first- and second-generation devices.
To improve on the next generation, more research in the area of smart home security is vital. Given
the pace at which smart devices are being introduced, an easy-to-understand security standard is
already overdue. Future research could integrate the Smart Home Extensions into the ASVS. With
some modification, such a document could be adapted to a wide variety of smart devices, and the
ASVS could be applied to any device that hosts an application.
The data set created by this research could also be used to update the OWASP Internet of
Things Top 10 List. As it stands, the current list is based on an evaluation of just 10 devices. More
data, even from four devices, would improve the accuracy and therefore usefulness of that project.
Along those lines, more research looking at the relative security or insecurity of devices
and products that are meant to help manage people’s lives is needed. As articulated by Thomas S.
Monson, “When performance is measured, performance improves.

When performance is

measured and reported, the rate of improvement accelerates.” (Monson 1970) By measuring and
reporting on the security performance of smart devices, that performance will improve.
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APPENDIX A: SUPPLEMENTARY MATERIALS

The Smart Home Extensions, with references and notes, can be seen in the body of the
paper as figures 1 and 2. A Microsoft Excel format spreadsheet of the Extensions is also in a
compressed file which can be obtained from any of the links at the bottom of this page.
The raw testing data is contained in four Microsoft Excel format spreadsheets. These are
also included in the compressed file. There is one spreadsheet for each device, and each
spreadsheet contains separate tabs or worksheets for each category of the ASVS. For a quick
reference of vulnerabilities discovered organized by hub, please refer to table 10 in section 7.2.
A clean version of the tracking spreadsheet I used is also available in the compressed file.
The spreadsheet contains separate tabs or worksheets for each category of the ASVS and the
cover page calculates percentage passed and generates the circular graph automatically. As
mentioned previously, this spreadsheet is based heavily on one made available by Florent Batard
(Batard 2014).
Finally, the 2014 version of the OWASP Application Security Verification Standard,
upon which the Smart Home Extensions are based, is also included for in the compressed file for
completeness.
•! https://cybersecurity.byu.edu/sites/default/files/supplement.zip
•! https://cybersecurity.byu.edu/projects/smarthome
•! http://www.redsteve.com/smarthome
77

